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Abstract 
This piece reflects on the role of  public procurement regulation in the face of  a situation, such as the
COVID-19 pandemic, generating an extremely urgent need for the public sector to buy additional supplies
and equipment. Counterintuitively, at a time of  heightened public expenditure, public procurement rules are
‘deactivated’. That does not mean that unusual procurement mechanisms are not ‘activated’, though, as the
example of  the EU’s Joint Procurement Agreement shows. It also does not mean that ‘reactivating’ public
procurement regulation will not present challenges, some of  which deserve careful consideration.
Keywords: public procurement; extreme emergency; negotiated procedure without
publication; COVID-19; joint procurement agreement; economic stimulus.
Introduction
Public procurement is at the forefront of  the response to the challenges of  COVID-19.Only well-equipped hospitals can save patients’ lives without endangering those of  the
medical, nursing and support workers in the NHS. Shortages of  relatively simple
consumables such as personal protection equipment (PPE), but also cleaning and hygiene
products, can endanger lives and have devastating effects on the resilience of  the healthcare
system to (continue to) cope with the pandemic. Shortages of  essential equipment such as
ventilators can have even more direct nefarious impacts on individual lives. 
The importance of  public procurement and supply chain management has rarely been
so prominently in the public eye and political debate – except, perhaps, in the case of
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notorious procurement scandals, such as the recent Brexit-related so-called ‘ferrygate’.1 In
this piece, I reflect on some of  the emerging issues in the procurement response to
COVID-19 and on the perhaps even bigger challenges that will follow, from a regulatory
perspective.
1 ‘Deactivating’ procurement rules
Given the importance of  public procurement in the current context, it is perhaps
counterintuitive that public procurement regulation vanishes in the face of  such
challenges. Where unforeseeable and extremely urgent circumstances not attributable to
the contracting authority arise, public procurement rules get out of  the way to free public
buyers up to do all they can to get the required supplies and equipment. This is embedded
in the system, probably as a result of  the long experience all public administrations have
historically had in bending or setting the procurement rules aside when more important
(or at least, more urgent) public interests than ensuring probity and economy in the
expenditure of  public funds arise. 
The ‘deactivation’ of  procurement rules in the face of  extreme emergencies could not
have been put more clearly than in the Guidance on Procurement related to the COVID-19 Crisis2
from the European Commission (the Commission) which stressed that under such
conditions: 
... public buyers may negotiate directly with potential contractor(s) and there are
no publication requirements, no time limits, no minimum number of  candidates to be consulted,
or other procedural requirements. No procedural steps are regulated at EU level. In practice,
this means that authorities can act as quickly as is technically/physically feasible
– and the procedure may constitute a de facto direct award only subject to
physical/technical constraints related to the actual availability and speed of
delivery’.3 (emphasis added)
This bold and clear statement and policy steer at EU level echoes the earlier guidance
published by UK Cabinet Office in its Policy Note on Responding to COVID-19,4 which more
sparsely (or perhaps cautiously) stated that ‘in responding to COVID-19, contracting
authorities may enter into contracts without competing or advertising the requirement’.
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1     See e.g. University of  Bristol Law School, ‘Dr Albert Sanchez-Graells’ #FerryGate evidence discussed in
House of  Commons emergency debate’ (14 March 2019)
<http://www.bristol.ac.uk/law/news/2019/ferrygate-evidence-discussed-in-hoc-debate.html>. For more
details, see National Audit Office, ‘The award of  contracts for additional freight capacity on ferry services’
(February 2019) <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/The-award-of-contracts-for-
additional-freight-capacity-on-ferry-services.pdf>; and idem, ‘Out-of-court settlement with Eurotunnel’
(May 2019) <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Out-of-court-settlement-with-
Eurotunnel.pdf>. 
2     European Commission, Guidance on using the public procurement framework in the emergency situation
related to the COVID-19 crisis [2020] OJ C108I/1. For a full analysis, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘European
Commission’s Guidance on Extreme Emergency Procurement and COVID-19 – some thoughts and a word
on the Dyson contract’ (howtocrackanut.com, 1 April 2020)
<https://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2020/4/1/european-commissions-guidance-on-extreme-
emergency-procurement-and-covid-19-some-thoughts>.
3     European Commission Guidance (n 2) section 1, emphasis added.
4     Procurement Policy Note on Responding to COVID-19 (PPN 01/20, 18 March 2020)
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/procurement-policy-note-0120-responding-to-covid-19>.
For a full analysis, see A Sanchez-Graells ‘Extreme emergency procurement and COVID-19 – re today’s UK
guidance’ (howtocrackanut.com, 18 Mar 2020) <https://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2020/3/18/extreme-
emergency-procurement-and-covid-19-re-todays-uk-guidance>.
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Of  course, a complete retreat from public procurement rules is a narrow exemption
and it needs to be interpreted and applied as such.5 Written justification for the use of
direct awards, as well as the different steps in the decision-making process leading to the
choice of  specific contractors and the agreement of  specific conditions need to be duly
documented and subject to proper record-keeping. Those records will be very relevant for
the assessment (and potential challenge) of  procurement decisions once the emergency
ends, in particular where there are doubts as to the contracting authority’s respect for the
boundaries of  the extreme emergency procurement exemption. Both the Commission’s
and the Cabinet Office’s documents provide detailed and actionable guidance to public
buyers on how to check that they face extreme urgency in the carrying out of  a specific
procurement. Beyond these basic requirements of  good administration, no other public
procurement rules remain active in the context of  the current extreme emergency.
What could be perhaps even more surprising is that the Commission has taken a
commercially oriented approach to its guidance and, for example, explicitly endorsed
‘active buying’ techniques, which should reassure contracting authorities taking abnormal
steps to try and secure emergency supplies of  PPE, ventilators and any other needed
equipment and consumables. Indeed, the Commission guidance explicitly mentions that: 
In order to speed up their procurements public buyers may also consider to:
contact potential contractors in and outside the EU by phone, e-mail or in
person, hire agents that have better contacts in the markets, send representatives
directly to the countries that have the necessary stocks and can ensure immediate
delivery, [or] contact potential suppliers to agree to an increase in production or
the start or renewal of  production.6
This is certainly welcome and will provide comfort to those taking a more commercial
approach than they usually would to market engagement (or scouting).
Further than that, the Commission also endorsed the use of  urgent procurement to
spur market innovation and matchmaking, thus dispelling doubts about the legality (under
procurement rules) of  even more active interventions in the market whereby the
contracting authority is directly involved in structuring the collaboration between
potential suppliers (and even potential competitors, although this will require careful
competition law assessment), for example, through COVID-19 challenges or hackathons.
In that regard, the guidance is also clear that:
... [t]o satisfy their needs, public buyers may have to look for alternative and
possibly innovative solutions, which might already be available on the market or
could be capable of  being deployed at (very) short notice. Public buyers will have to
identify solutions and interact with potential suppliers in order to assess whether these
alternatives meet their needs … Public buyers are fully empowered under the EU framework
to engage with the market and in matchmaking activities. There are various ways to
interact with the market to stimulate the supply and for the medium term needs,
the application of  urgent procedures could prove a more reliable means of
getting better value for money and wider access to available supplies.7
The guidance also stresses the relevance of  these approaches in terms of  boosting the
uptake of  other strategic considerations so that ‘environmental, innovative and social
requirements, including accessibility to any services procured, are integrated in the
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procurement process’.8 However, it is unlikely that contracting authorities will be able to
concentrate efforts on this, even if  they can obtain some of  the benefits due to engaging
in some ‘unconventional’ procurement approaches, including more digital procurement
(and innovation related to 3D printing, for example).
These general policy and strategic guidelines clearly convey the basic message that
procurement professionals should do all they can to obtain the urgently required supplies,
as well as aim to transition to a more sustainable (and planned, and hopefully less
expensive and more innovative) approach in the medium term. The basic message is thus:
procure what we need as best as you can and not worry about the rules for now.
2 Proactive international coordination efforts
However, the deactivation of  public procurement regulation does not mean that all
procurement mechanisms are set aside. On the contrary, there are specific procurement
arrangements that seek to coordinate international responses to public health threats. In
particular, the EU’s Joint Procurement Agreement for the Procurement of  Medical Countermeasures
(JPA)9 has also gained notoriety in recent weeks.10
The JPA is a sui generis agreement that allows its signatories to jointly procure the
medical countermeasures (that is, not only medication) required to respond to a serious
cross-border health threat. As of  30 March 2020, all EU countries, the UK and two EEA
countries had signed the JPA, with some very recent COVID-19-related additions to the
list of  signatories (Sweden, Poland, Norway, Finland and Iceland).11 The EU launched
procurement procedures under the JPA, both for PPE12 and for ventilators.13
The purpose and operation of  the JPA are largely unknown or misunderstood, even
by public procurement specialists. Without getting into technicalities, I would stress that
the JPA is simply a mechanism of  international collaboration that seeks to avoid
duplication of  procurement procedures at national level and competition between buyers
for the sourcing of  the supplies that, not only they may all need, but which they may need
in different amounts and at different times. The JPA is primarily a mechanism of
coordination of  the procurement procedure and, more importantly, of  the execution of
the supply contracts through specific case-by-case agreements on how to distribute the
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8     Ibid.
9     See relevant documents available at
<https://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/joint_procurement_en>. For in-depth discussion,
see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘The EU’s Joint Procurement Agreement: how does it work, and why did the UK
not participate?’ (howtocrackanut.com, 4 April 2020) <https://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2020/4/4/the-
eus-joint-procurement-agreement-how-does-it-work-and-why-did-the-uk-not-participate-procurement-pill-
with-recording>.
10   The JPA needs to be distinguished from the also novel and rather unconventional creation of  an EU
stockpile of  necessary supplies – the rescEU stockpile; see Commission Implementing Decision (EU)
2019/570 of  8 April 2019 laying down rules for the implementation of  Decision No 1313/2013/EU of  the
European Parliament and of  the Council as regards rescEU capacities and amending Commission
Implementing Decision 2014/762/EU [2019] L 99/41; as amended by Commission Implementing Decision
(EU) 2020/414 of  19 March 2020 amending Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/570 as regards medical
stockpiling rescEU capacities [2020] OJ L 82I/1.
11   See <https://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/joint_procurement/jpa_signature_en>.
12   European Commission, ‘Coronavirus: Commission bid to ensure supply of  personal protective equipment
for the EU proves successful’ (24 March 2020)
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_523>. This followed a first unsuccessful
attempt; see contract award notice 2020/S 051-119976 of  12 March 2020.
13   It has been reported that the procedure was launched on 16 March 2020, although there is no public
information on the outcomes as of  the time of  writing (6 April 2020).
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quantities procured across participating countries, allowing for a concentration of
supplies on those in acute need, as well as donation of  quotas. The JPA is also a
mechanism that can aggregate buying power and improve the participating countries’
collective-bargaining position, although that is highly dependent on the supply-side
structure of  the relevant markets.
The governance of  the JPA is two-tiered, with a first-tier JPA-wide Steering
Committee with representation from all signatories entrusted with general issues in the
administration of  the cross-border collaboration, and a second-tier Specific Procurement
Procedure Steering Committee (SPPSC) for each of  the procurement procedures
launched under the JPA, with representation of  the participating states and the
Commission only.14 Signatories of  the JPA have no obligation to participate in any
specific joint procurements and thus the composition of  the SPPSC is variable, with the
committed financial contribution being a relevant factor in the allocation of  votes. The
SPPSC retains decision-making powers and aims to operate on the basis of  common
accord or, failing that, qualified majority for the most relevant decisions. The JPA only
transfers to the Commission an executive role in the design and execution of  the
procurement procedure, which is carried out under the strict surveillance of  and with a
range of  necessary approvals by the SPPSC. Moreover, participating countries are not
barred from engaging in parallel procurement procedures at national level (which can be
a weakness rather than a strength of  the system).
The JPA has a sui generis legal nature. It is subjected to EU law and operates as a
budgetary implementing measure of  Decision 1082/2013/EU.15 Litigation resulting from
disputes between signatories of  the JPA is to be heard by the Court of  Justice of  the
European Union (CJEU). Procurement under the JPA is carried out in accordance with
the Financial Regulation – currently, the Omnibus Regulation 2018/1046/EU.16 This
implies that any challenges to the procurement decisions need to be heard by the General
Court.17
However, each of  the participating countries is meant to enter into direct legal and
economic relationships with the relevant contractors and ‘[t]he law applicable to
framework or direct contracts pursuant to [the JPA] and the competent court for the
hearing of  disputes under these contracts shall be determined in these contracts’.18
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14   See European Commission, Explanatory Note on the Joint Procurement Mechanism (December 2015)
<https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/preparedness_response/docs/jpa_explanatory_en.pdf>.
15   Decision No 1082/2013/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  22 October 2013 on
serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC [2013] L 293/1. See
European Commission, Considerations on the legal basis and the legal nature of  the Joint Procurement
Agreement (undated)
<https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/preparedness_response/docs/jpa_legal_nature_en.pdf>. 
16   Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  18 July 2018 on
the financial rules applicable to the general budget of  the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No
1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU)
No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 [2018] L 193/1. For discussion of  some of  the main requirements,
see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Transparency in procurement by the EU institutions’, in K-M Halonen, R Caranta
and A Sanchez-Graells (eds), Transparency in EU Procurements: Disclosure within Public Procurement and During
Contract Execution, vol 9 EPL Series (Edward Elgar 2019) 82–104.
17   On the limitations that this implies, see European Court of  Auditors, Special Report No 17/2016, ‘The EU
institutions can do more to facilitate access to their public procurement’ (13 July 2016)
<https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=37137>.
18   JPA, article 42(2).
85
The JPA is thus a non-exclusive ‘procurement only’ sui generis agreement. The only
clearly pre-defined legal issues concern the subjection of  the JPA and the ensuing
procurement (up to award) to EU law and CJEU jurisdiction only. Its final legal structure
is left to specific decisions of  the participating member states (and market acceptability).
The legal set-up of  the JPA and, more importantly, the sets of  framework agreements
and specific contracts which it is meant to generate are yet to be subjected to detailed
analysis.19 The COVID-19 crisis and the use of  the JPA in responding to it will be a test
of  this mechanism for international coordination at European level and provide
additional practical insights into its operation. At the time of  writing, the emerging
picture is mixed, although only time will tell. 
The same can be said of  the UK’s decision not to participate in the JPA and rather go
it alone in seeking to procure large numbers of  ventilators.20 I would be remiss not to put
on the record that I harbour serious doubts as to the drivers for that decision, and some
specific contract awards in particular,21 and that I would like to see a full enquiry into that
decision as soon as the UK Parliament is back in session.22
3 Some challenges in reactivating procurement after the COVID-19 crisis
Looking beyond the COVID-19 crisis, I think three further challenges lie ahead. 
The first one concerns the reactivation of  standard procurement rules, once the
conditions of  extreme emergency subside. This will not happen overnight, nor in the
same way across contracting authorities or across categories of  supplies and equipment.
It will thus be a challenge for each contracting authority, but also for those with oversight
powers, to make a call as to when ‘normal procurement’ must resume. Litigation on these
issues is also likely to arise, in particular if  the extreme emergency situation lasts for a long
time and economic operators need to challenge each opportunity to get public sector
contracts shielded from competition under the cover of  the extreme urgency exemption.
The second challenge lies in learning from the crisis. Significant thought and research
will have to go into understanding what contingency planning (and procurement) needs
to be in place to ensure an adequate level of  readiness for the next pandemic. It will also
be very important to extract lessons from the international coordination efforts (in the
EU, but also beyond). Both of  these areas of  analysis are likely to be very prominent, and
they should. 
But this should not lead us to forget that there is more learning to be extracted from
this situation. An important area for research and analysis concerns the ‘unconventional’
or more commercial approaches to procurement that public buyers are taking once the
rules have been deactivated. I will be personally very interested to see to which extent,
perhaps with minor tweaks, they can be adopted in ‘normal times’ and under full
application of  the procurement rules. My working hypothesis is that most of  the practices
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19   For discussion of  related issues, with further references, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘The emergence of  trans-
EU collaborative procurement: a “living lab” for European public law’ (2020) 29(1) Public Procurement
Law Review 16–41.
20   For discussion, see M Flear, ‘EU joint procurement – UK’s delayed participation undermines the NHS and
risks lives’ (UK in a Changing Europe, 27 March 2020) <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/eu-joint-procurement-uks-
delayed-participation-undermines-the-nhs-and-risks-lives/>.
21   While I have no doubts about the general legality of  the actions of  the UK government, my main concern
is with the award of  an emergency contract to a consortium that, at the time of  writing, is yet to obtain
regulatory approval for its proposed respiratory ventilator. For details, see Sanchez-Graells (n 2).
22   For extended discussion, see the debate in multiple entries between P Telles in telles.eu (starting on 24
March) and myself  in howtocrackanut.com (for the same period).
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that will emerge from the flexibility created under the current ‘no rules’ scenario can be
retained in the future, contrary to the standard claim that procurement rules are unduly
rigid and too limiting on the exercise of  discretion by public buyers. I look forward to
having a chance to test it.
A third possible challenge lies in making sure that the situation of  extreme emergency
does not morph into one where public procurement is used purely as an economic
stimulus mechanism, with the ensuing disregard (or bending) of  the rules to achieve
specific economic goals. This risk is in two parts. One is about protectionism and the use
of  procurement for industrial policy purposes, of  which there were already very clear
signs before the COVID-19 crisis (in Europe and in the UK). The other part concerns
the target for the (additional) public expenditure to be channelled through procurement. 
Here, a lesson from the use of  procurement by Spain in the aftermath of  the 2008
financial crisis may be a cautionary tale. A significant proportion of  additional public
expenditure (the so-called ‘Plan E’) was dedicated to minor works procured by local
authorities (notoriously, improving sidewalks and fixing potholes). While that was seen to
address a short-term employment problem, it certainly did not do much to improve the
country’s infrastructure or to prepare it for future changes in labour markets. 
Post COVID-19, every procurement package aimed at restarting the economy needs
to avoid that short-termism. In my opinion, the (unavoidable) stimulation of  the
economy through procurement needs to be oriented towards ground transport
infrastructure or digital infrastructure and services projects, have a very clear
environmental orientation and contribute to the fight against climate change, as well as be
coupled with significant investment in re-skilling and life-long education programmes.
Conclusion
On the whole, while procurement regulation is dormant in the initial phase of  the
COVID-19 crisis, it will have a very significant role to play as it subsides and when it
passes. This is perhaps a counter-cyclical understanding of  procurement and its role in a
crisis, but I think it reflects the oddities of  these challenging times of  COVID-19.
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